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**“Presence” is only forces**

**DOD, 15** – DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 6/15, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod\_dictionary/index.html?zoom\_query=base&zoom\_sort=0&zoom\_per\_page=10&zoom\_and=1

Forward Presence- (DOD) Maintaining forward-deployed or stationed forces overseas to demonstrate national resolve, strengthen alliances, dissuade potential adversaries, and enhance the ability to respond quickly to contingencies.

**“Activities” are not “forces” or “presence”**

**Flournoy, 97** – Michele Flournoy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy at the DOD, “OVERSEAS PRESENCE: More Data and Analysis Needed to Determine Whether Cost-Effective Alternatives Exist”, GAO Report, June, http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/155893.pdf

Limitations in Study Methodology

The report's analytical approach has serious methodological limitations. By grouping forces (people and hardware) and activities (things these forces do) in a single list of overseas presence approaches, the study mixes means (forces and infrastructure overseas) and ways (how these forces and infrastructure are employed). The study then ranks the relative importance of these ways and means according to consensus reached by panels of CINC staff officials. This analytical construct, manifested in the report's "expert choice" hierarchical decision model, misleads the reader unfamiliar with overseas presence issues by implying that means and ways are interchangeable. They are not. For example, the GAO groups forces that are necessary to conduct interaction as an equivalent approach with interaction activities. This could lead a reader to conclude that the means available to achieve an objective could be eliminated while simultaneously increasing emphasis on the ways those means are employed.

**Reduce is a net reduction**

**Dictionary.com 15**

reduce [ri-doos, -dyoos] Spell Syllables Synonyms Examples Word Origin verb (used with object), reduced, reducing. 1. to bring down to a smaller extent, size, amount,number, etc.:

**Significant reduction of troops is a 20 percent reduction**

**Barasso 15 – Chair of the Senate Policy Committee**

[Senator John Barasso, Senate Republican Policy Committee 15 – FY 16 Defense Authorization Bill, 6-3-15, http://www.rpc.senate.gov/legislative-notices/s-1376\_fy-16-defense-authorization-bill]

Section 1221.

Expresses the sense of the Senate that the drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan should be based on security conditions in Afghanistan and U.S. security interests in the region. It goes on to require the president to certify that any ordered significant reduction in U.S. forces in Afghanistan will result in an acceptable level of risk to U.S. national security objectives. A significant reduction is defined as the lesser of 1,000 or more troops or a 20 percent reduction of troops then deployed in Afghanistan.

**That also precludes transfers**

**Kentucky Ct of Appeals 84** (Paducah v. Moore, 662 S.W.2d 491, Lexis---sex edited)

No one quarrels with the appellants' argument that HN3 the city has the power to transfer or even discharge employees at will. The right to do so, however, is restricted by Statutes of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. The language of KRS 90.360(1) above is quite clear in prohibiting reduction in grade of a classified service employee of the City except for cause and after a hearing upon appropriate written charges. In interpreting identical language concerning prohibition against reduction in grade provided for in KRS 95.450(1), our former Court of Appeals stated in Schrichte vs. Bornhorn, Ky., 376 S.W.2d 683 (1964):∂ . . . we are of the opinion that the term 'grade' means rank, whereas it appears that the appellant interprets it more broadly as job classification. Obviously by the use of the word 'reduce,' the Statute envisages a verticle scale. If a [person] is transferred without a loss in pay from one job category to another with comparable authority, his classification is changed, but his grade is not reduced.

**Voting issue---**

**Limits---there are thousands of ways to tweak the conduct of forces, in addition to reduction in forces, in a dozen different countries---explodes research and makes preparation impossible**

**Ground---changing force levels is a key stable mechanism for links to DAs like deterrence and politics---core ground is key to fairness**

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**Text: The United States should end all of its counterterrorism missions in the Greater Horn of Africa and Yemen. The United States should assign its military presence in the Greater Horn of Africa to MEDCAP.**

**Military MEDCAPs improve community health and support HIV treatment.**

**Miles and Malone 13** – Shana Miles, Medical Doctor @ Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, Bethesda, Joseph L. Malone, Medical Officer, CDC Resident Advisor and Advisor to President's Malaria Initiative, 2013 (“Perspectives From Ethiopia Regarding U.S. Military Humanitarian Assistance: How to Build a Better Medical Civil Action Project (MEDCAP)” *Military Medicine*, Volume 178, December 2013, PDF available through *EBSCO*)

The U.S. Government (USG) has rapidly increased support for health programs in Africa over the last decade, often requiring the participation of many governmental and nongovernmental organization (NGO) partners.'" In 2010, most of the USG's approximately $350 million of annual global health assistance to Ethiopia was managed by either the U,S, Agency of International Development (USAID) or the U.S, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). This was composed of about 60 health projects that were implemented mostly by NGOs, These costly USG-supported health projects spanned most districts in Ethiopia and supported HIV, malaria, tuberculosis, and maternal-child health issues. One of the consequences of these expansive USG-supported global health programs is that despite many obvious basic health needs in Ethiopia, it takes significant effort at the U.S, Embassy to ensure coordination and non-duplication of effort among NGOs, For decades, medical civil action projects (MEDCAPs) have been a part of the U.S, military's cooperative engagements with many developing countries,"\* and the authors' experience in Ethiopia from 2009 to 2013 suggests that such projects might continue to be beneficial to the USG and to Ethiopia, Recent military guidance requires medical civil action projects (MEDCAPs) in Africa to plan to provide for sustainability and to be approved by the U.S. Ambassador and to be coordinated and sustained through USAID.\*

The unexpected delays and non-approvals of several proposed MEDCAPs in recent months in Ethiopia prompted the authors to describe the current health situation from an interagency perspective and include suggestions on how to plan MEDCAPs that have a higher probability of ultimately being approved and completed successfully in Ethiopia. Ideally, this would lead to the development of sustainable capacities and other positive outcomes. Given the expected constraints of global health budgets in the next several years,^ the host government and other USG agencies and health partners might expect, and increasingly appreciate, carefully planned MEDCAPs that could add value to other USG-supported global health and humanitarian assistance projects.

**HIV/AIDS is pretty damn bad.**

**Letcher 8** – Major Kenneth W. Letcher, Brigade Support Battalion Support Operations Officer Trainer at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, Brigade Support Battalion Support Operations Officer Trainer at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, 553rd Combat Sustainment Support Battalion commander, U.S. Army, 2008 (“HIV/AIDS: A Nontraditional Security Threat for AFRICOM,” *US Army Command and General Staff College*, 2008, PDF, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA485701>)

In addition to the catastrophic effects that HIV/AIDS inflicts on the infected individual, HIV/AIDS negatively affects several layers of a given community by affecting the human capital of that population. First and most personally, HIV/AIDS negatively affects the household through increased spending on healthcare.41 This increased spending is associated with a loss of income due to illnessrelated absence from work or the inability to work. As a result of the effects of HIV/AIDS, families transition priorities and spending habits away from education and other necessities such as food, shelter, and clothing towards direct means to provide income to the family to offset HIV/AIDS monetary necessities.42

The community and region are also affected by high prevalence rates because the increased mortality rates that accompany HIV/AIDS results in a younger, less skilled labor force. The youth of this labor force leads to reduced productivity, because the work force has less knowledge and work experience.43 Additionally, workers will take more time off to help tend to infected members of their family; this lost time at work also contributes to reduced productivity.44 From a governmental standpoint, AIDS, as it kills off young adults between the ages of 15 to 49, weakens the tax base of a community or region, which negatively impacts the money available to a government for public expenditures, for example, education, healthcare for both AIDS and non-AIDS-related matters, and the military.45 In addition to killing mostly young adults, AIDS deprives the next generation from resources vital to their transition into the economy. Specifically, “children lose the love, care guidance, and knowledge of one or both parents, which plausibly weakens the transmission of knowledge and capacity from generation to generation.”46

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**The US and China compete in Africa – China perceives American withdrawal as an opportunity to expand influence in Africa**

**Sun 15** – Yun Sun, nonresident fellow in the Africa Growth Initiative at the Brookings Institute, senior associate with the East Asia Program at the Stimson Center, master's degree in international policy and practice from George Washington University, MA in Asia Pacific studies and a BA in international relations from Foreign Affairs College in Beijing, 2015 (“The Limits of U.S.-China Cooperation in Africa,” *Brookings*, April 6th, <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2015/04/06-limit-us-china-cooperation-in-africa-sun>)

For the past few years, calls for the U.S. and China to cooperate on security and development issues in Africa have been increasingly popular. American and Chinese think tanks have been keen on identifying common ground and issue areas in Africa in which the two powers can work together. In fact, in a 2014 study by the China Institute of International Studies, Chinese scholars identified “an urgent need” for China and the U.S. to coordinate on African affairs. Brookings even hosted a U.S., Africa, and China trilateral dialogue in 2013 to explore potential opportunities for collaboration. The Council on Foreign Relations and Center for Strategic and International Studies have also devoted much attention to the issue. These calls have not been futile: The most recent U.S.-China Africa Consultation hosted in Beijing in late 2014 discussed cooperation around the Ebola crisis and other common threats on the continent.

However, despite the rhetoric and enthusiasm, people might be disappointed at the reality, which is that exemplary cases of successful cooperation between Washington and Beijing on the continent remain scarce. The few examples of collaboration are on issues of the “lowest common denominator” (most basic and least controversial), such as the flaring crisis in Sudan/South Sudan and severe non-traditional threats such as the Ebola outbreak. Upon examining the American and Chinese perspectives on cooperation in Africa, more realistic expectations as to what the two powers can and will jointly do for a better Africa might be warranted.

The logic of U.S.-China cooperation in Africa is a sound one. Both Beijing and Washington have important political and economic interests in promoting peace and development of Africa. The two countries’ vested interests in Africa, particularly in commercial investment, make peace and stability imperative. In addition, as two responsible powers, the countries carry a shared moral obligation to Africa. In cases such as South Sudan, both the U.S. and China stand much to lose if the crisis continues to fester. Furthermore, a stable and prosperous Africa will provide both the U.S. and China more investment and trade opportunities, which can enhance the momentum for their cooperation.

Nevertheless, while scholars and media reports on both sides have produced numerous papers and analysis on what the U.S. and China “could” or “should” do to cooperate in Africa (as listed above), concrete cooperation that the two countries are in fact pursuing or planning to pursue is yet to develop quickly.

The fundamental cause of inadequate U.S.-China cooperation in Africa is an underlying sense of zero-sum competition between the two powers on the continent. Essentially, the U.S. and China are yet to see each other as genuine cooperation partners or friendly forces on many important issues due to their diverging perceptions and national interests. On the U.S. side, a 2014 RAND study accurately captures the current U.S. perspective and reflects the U.S.’s concern around China’s expanding influence in Africa and about the U.S. losing in the Africa game. After listing details of China’s expanding engagements in the continent and how they undermine U.S. influence, the report recommends that the U.S. counter Chinese efforts such as the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) by cultivating relations with a wider range of African countries. Following the same line of thought, President Obama took a swipe at China during the 2014 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit by differentiating the U.S. approach from those that “look to Africa simply for its natural resources … and simply want to extract minerals from the ground …” Although the president did not mention China by name, the comments were clearly aimed at Beijing.

Such a competitive theme is also popular in China. As summarized by a 2013 report by the China Academy of Social Sciences, “the strengthening of the West’s influence in Africa means that China will face more difficulties in achieving its strategic interests in Africa … The West’s current campaign to deepen their influence presents more strategic competition to China … China should focus more on a competitive strategy in Africa.” Chinese analysts are keen to study how the U.S.’s Africa strategies might affect or undermine Chinese political and commercial interests on the ground. Some have suspected that the American interventions in Mali, Sudan, South Sudan, and Libya were indeed targeted at undercutting Chinese economic interests in those countries. To counter American criticism of China’s resource-centric economic engagement, China has also grown increasingly adept at attributing such disapproval to Americans’ “sore loser” mentality.

Other than the strong sense of competition, another key factor that hinders U.S.-China cooperation in Africa is the different approaches and standards the two countries have adopted on issues such as foreign aid and development assistance. While China does not allow political issues such as democratic or authoritarian systems to interfere with its pragmatic ties with African countries, the U.S. has strong value-oriented policies that prevent Washington from engaging regimes with poor human rights records. On the technical level, China views development and foreign aid as practical policy instruments to promote political friendship and economic cooperation, while the U.S. attaches clearly stated goals, stringent conditions, and strict criteria to its development programs. In reality, these vast differences significantly limit the potential for U.S.-China cooperation.

**Chinese presence results in widespread exploitation of African resources and minerals and exacerbates conflict.**

**Zhao 14** – Suisheng Zhao, Professor, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, Director of the Center for China-U.S. Cooperation, 2014 (“A Neo-Colonialist Predator or Development Partner? China's engagement and rebalance in Africa,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, Volume 23, Issue 90, April 28th, Taylor & Francis Online)

One reason for the accusation that China is engaged in a form of new colonialism is its importing of resources from Africa and dumping manufactured goods there. While China's main imports from Africa are primary products with little added value for Africa, including crude oil, copper, ores and minerals, Africa is a large buyer of manufactured products such as machinery and textiles from China. This pattern skewed economic ties and undermined linkages between Chinese investment and local economies because resource exports do not necessarily translate into widespread job creation to help improve living standards for ordinary people. Even South Africa, the continent's biggest and most industrialized economy, as well as a major coal and iron ore producer, faced an imbalance. With an official unemployment rate of 25%, South Africa's ruling ANC regularly talked about the need to boost domestic industry. In particular, it would like to see its minerals processed at home. But parts of South Africa's manufacturing sector, nearly 20% of the economy, were in direct competition with China, and in many cases were losing the battle against a much cheaper producer. Labor-intensive industries such as textiles, clothing, footwear and furniture, were the hardest hit, with more than 40% of footwear and knitted fabrics purchased in South Africa coming from China.30

China is criticized for taking advantage of African countries' need for investments and financing in return for natural resource extraction rights. In addition, rights activists accuse the Chinese of cutting corners, exploiting corrupt local officials and ignoring health, safety and environmental concerns. While China procures the resources it needs to continue its rapid rise, at the end of the process, African nations will stagnate and their people will no longer have the precious and scarce resources they need to rise out of poverty. Indeed, cutting deals and securing supplies of natural resources, China has moved aggressively into the continent. Big state-owned energy companies such as China Petrochemical Corp. and China National Petroleum Corp. have all invested in major oil and gas projects in Africa. Sinohydro Corp has also capitalized on the continent's vast hydropower resources. Chinese companies have pushed deeper into the forests of Mozambique although China itself had introduced widespread logging bans at home in 1999 in order to stop the deforestation that was blamed for soil erosion and severe flooding. China also established a huge operation in Zambia, which has the second-largest reserves of raw copper in Africa. Building a special economic zone in the Copper Belt, China is both the world's biggest user of copper and the eighth largest exporter of refined copper products. Although China is by no means alone in prioritizing its economic relationships with countries of strategic or commercial significance to itself, China's snapping up of the resources in Africa's mountains, forests and offshore waters led some critics to conjure up the vision of a zero-sum competition for finite resources that could trigger a new wave of global conflict and massive environmental destruction in Africa.

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**CP: The United States should end drone strikes in Yemen.**

**Withdrawing drone presence from the Horn of Africa decimates African counterterror operations – radical terrorist ideology makes it impossible to address root causes, so only drones can contain the spread of terrorism**

**Attuquayefio 14** – Philip Attuquayefio, Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and a Master of Philosophy in International Affairs from the University of Ghana, Legon, currently a Research Fellow at the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy, University of Ghana, 2014 (“Drones, the US and the New Wars in Africa,” *Journal of Terrorism Research*, September 2014, The Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, <http://ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk/index.php/jtr/article/view/942/757>)

Just like the terrorist threats, the approaches for US interventions on matters of national security have also evolved. From conspicuous full-scale military actions in the Bush and Clinton years to the “light footprints” favored by the Obama administration. The latter has involved the use of Special Forces, and other relatively more discreet approaches. A critical element of the Obama administration’s counterterrorism approaches is the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) popularly known as Drones. UAVs are remotely controlled aircrafts designed with a capacity to carry a wide variety of accessories for both civilian and military use. These include long range and wide angled cameras, communication and target detection sensors and military hardware such as missiles. Added to this is the stealth ability of some drones. Consequently, they are typical for reconnaissance, surveillance and target engagement missions (Washburn & Kress, 2009). Although, it’s been suggested that experimentation with drones have been ongoing since the early 1990s, its first deployment in a context of war was in the former Yugoslavia in the mid–1990s where they were reportedly used as surveillance equipment (Turse & Engelhardt, 2012). Subsequent evolution of drones saw its emergence as armaments for target engagement particularly in post 9/11counterterrorism activities of the US. One of the early cases in this regard was reported in Yemen in 2002, where six alleged Al Qaeda operatives were killed by drone fire (Kretzmer, 2005). Since then, it is fast gaining notoriety as the armament of choice from the options available to the US. The use of drones has however not been without controversy both in host countries where it has, for instance, garnered political fallouts generally deemed as unfavorable to US moral leverage in global affairs, and within the domestic politics of the US, where the administration has been accused of arbitrarily authorising execution of people including some US citizens. The latter has constituted a legal conundrum that continues to attract negative publicity to the use of drones. The tactical fallouts have been suggested as far direr, namely, an increase in volunteers ready to launch a global jihad against the US and its western allies following the fabrication of drone casualties in countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan and Yemen. (Taj, 2011) The readiness of the US to deploy drones towards prosecuting the war on terror in Africa has long gone beyond the assumptive phase. In 2001, the US acquired and renovated Camp Lemonnier from the armed forces of Djibouti and subsequently, in May 2003, designated the facility as the base for the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). Since then, Camp Lemonnier has earned the reputation as a critical base for drone operations around the Horn of Africa and Yemen. In March 2013, President Obama announced further plans to set up another base in the West African country of Niger. Djibouti and Niger have been officially confirmed, yet, reports suggest that the US has access to a lot more operational ranges for drones than publicly acknowledged (Whitlock & Miller, 2011). In terms of operability however, the first reported use of drones within the continent was a 2007 incident in which drones guided antitank missile gunships to blow down a convoy carrying one of Al Qaeda’s top operatives and suspected hideout in Somalia (Axe, 2012). Since then, the US is reported to have operated drones from a number of sites in Africa including Djibouti, and Burkina Faso. This paper utilises open source data to interrogate the state of terrorism in Africa (conceptualised as new wars) and the options applicable to the African context. It is argued that one of the ways the US can make game-changing interventions through surveillance and intelligence-gathering in several hotspots in Africa, without compromising its own national security is through the use of drones. The paper begins by briefly discussing the ‘new wars’ in Africa before making a case for the complementary utility of drones in fighting terrorism in Africa. It concludes by suggesting policy options to counter balance the utility-blighting publicity currently surrounding the use of drones in Africa. A caveat underpinning this paper is an admission by the author that the causal and sustaining factors of terrorism in Africa are multi-faceted and in most cases derive from threats to aspects of human security palpable in terrorists-generating communities. Consequently, the phenomenon can only be addressed through a multidimensional approach – one in which drones can actively feature mainly through surveillance and intelligence-gathering. TERRORISM: THE NEW WARS IN AFRICA In the aftermath of the independence wars, the second major wave of conflicts on the continent - the civil wars of the post-Cold War era between the late 1980s and early 1990s saw countries like Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Cote D’Ivoire among others witnessing a succession of violent conflicts. The consequence of these conflicts were abductions, systematic rape, genocide and a host of actions that fall within the generic description of terrorism. These acts were mainly domestic in nature and perpetrated by ethnic and political groups. It was therefore not surprising that the US maintained a general disinterest in activities in Africa during that period. The latter part of the 1990s witnessed a marginal rise in terrorist incidents on the continent of Africa. Unlike the previous period, an overwhelming majority of these acts were attributed to the activities of Islamic extremists. The manifestations of these acts were undoubtedly ruthless yet somewhat limited to relatively few countries in East and the Horn of Africa. In the 1998 attacks on the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, for instance, two hundred people are on record to have been killed and over a thousand injured. Yet in comparison to the global numbers, it was insignificant. In fact during that period, Africa placed a mere fifth, behind Latin America, Western Europe, Asia and the Middle East, as the most targeted regions for international acts of terrorism (Botha & Solomon, 2005). In the 21st century, acts of terrorism in Africa have gone up exponentially (Hough, 2002). This is attributable to a number of events. One of these has had to do with the post–9/11 War on terror, and the military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan by the US and its allies. Statistics have, for instance, shown dislocation and relocation of suicide terrorist cells and training camps as well as the death or detention of several top operatives of Al Qaeda following the commencement of the US led War on terror (Cronin, 2003). With the disruption of its activities, Al Qaeda has adopted a more diffused approach, one that has seen the centralised command and control previously held by Osama bin Laden diffuse to other parts of the world in line with the objective to strike soft targets of the US and its western allies. With Africa playing host to monumental commercial and state interests of the US and a number of Western countries, strikes against these targets have sought to demonstrate that al Qaeda and its affiliates still retain the will and the capacity to operate around the world (Crenshaw, 2011). Relatedly, the diffusion indirectly caused by the war on terror has made the identification and neutralising of terrorist cells more difficult. The post-independence narrative of a host of African countries has also been dominated by human insecurity arising out of the multivariate effects of poverty and general economic insecurity, environmental degradation, inadequate management of health related threats to survival as well as erosion in the significance of jealously guarded indigenous culture primarily through modernisation. These effects have been attributed to political instability occasioned mainly by the politics of coup d’états as well as the tradition of woeful governance and corruption that defines leadership in many of these countries. Consequently, elements of human security have traditionally not been accorded superlative positions in the thought processes of African States relative to the desire by successive regimes to hold on to power; and where they have, in such lopsided proportions that parts of the polity are palpable left out of development. Responses to these local dynamics have evolved from largely tame protests to outright militancy and terrorism. The surge towards the terrorism end of the continuum have within the last two decades obtained motivation from the relative successes of militant groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in locking down national and sometimes global attention to their causes. It is therefore not surprising that Somalia, Mali and Nigeria, three of the countries in Africa severely challenged by the activities of organised terror groups have had infamous records of human insecurity in specific parts of their territories. In Nigeria for instance, Uzodike and Maiangwa (2012) describe the governance challenges as “a cocktail of widespread failures of state policies, inefficient and wasteful parastatal, and endemic corruption, poverty, unemployment, and extensive underdevelopment in the North of Nigeria”. Within that context, it is not surprising that Boko Haram emerged and galvanised active membership among segments of the Northern population. The franchising of Al Qaeda has also contributed to the increase in terrorist activities on the continent. Out of these loose arrangements, terrorists’ organisations in Africa, continue to adopt and adapt the modus operandi of Al Qaeda. One of the foremost organisations depicting this franchise is Boko Haram. Operating mainly from the Northern parts of Nigeria since 2002, Boko Haram claims to be fighting for the institution of Islamic rule in Nigeria. Beyond their objective, their modes of operation; a combination of suicide attacks and car bombs in civilian areas, is dangerously similar to Al Qaeda’s mode of operation. Elsewhere on the continent, a number of terrorist organisations have engineered actions that fit within the anti-western agenda of Al Qaeda but also indicate, in some cases, the localised grievances of these groups. In North Africa for instance, Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has been engaged in some of the high profile terrorist actions against the West and its interests as well as supporters of western ideals (Masters, 2013). Their versatility, coupled with the porous borders and vast territories in the region as well as their collaboration with other like-minded organisations in the area has resulted in an expanding trans-regional terrorist network, fast gaining reputation not just for its adopted Al Qaeda tag but also a conspicuous résumé of terrorist activities. The West African Sub-Region is also home to two relatively recent terrorist organisations. Boko Haram operates mainly in Northern Nigeria and Cameroon, while Ansar Dine operates from Northern Mali. The former was formed in Maiduguri in 2002 as the Congregation and People of Tradition for Proselytism and Jihad (Onuoha, 2010). It is however known as Boko Haram, a Hausa moniker accorded to the group mainly on the basis of their proscription of western education. Similarly to AQIM, at foundation, the leaders of Boko Haram exploited Nigeria’s governance challenges particularly relating to corruption as well as socio-economic vulnerabilities which are more evident in the northern region to mobilise a base of followers, discontented with the status quo. With known links to AQIM (United Nations Security Council, 2014), and operating in a region with porous borders, the fear of Boko Haram expanding their influence is justified. In May 2013, a military offensive was launched against the group in Nigeria’s three northern states. Aided by the declaration of curfews in some cities and air strikes on identified training camps, the military indicated that the insurgents had been “halted” (Abrak, 2013). In spite of this, experience with terror cells in other parts of the world suggest that once the underlying motif is active, the dislocation arising through the decimation is merely temporal as groups and cells relocate and often hit back in a variety of revised ways. Moreover, in the particular case of Nigeria, the military has gained a reputation for exaggerating successes while downplaying setbacks (Waddington, 2014). It is therefore not surprising that subsequent to the May 2013 offensive, Boko Haram has proven to be even more organised and effective, striking key targets and conducting high profile operations such as the abduction of 200 girls from a Nigerian government secondary school in April, 2014. A further threat to the region is the presence of Ansaru, a breakaway of fringe elements in Boko Haram. Ansaru has since January, 2012 sought to enforce the fight for Islamist rule. Though a smaller group, it has sought, and perhaps obtained, recognition through high profile kidnapping and execution of western targets (Onuoha, 2013). Mali has provided another platform for brewing terrorism in Africa. With the fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya, mercenaries armed with weapons, proliferated during the war, moved into Northern Mali where ethnic Tuaregs have been engaged in a long-running rebellion with the government in Bamako over the independence of Azawad in the North. Mobilised under the name Ansar al-Dine, this group has since 2012, engaged in various acts of terrorism, thus earning the US State Departments’ categorisation as a terrorist organisation. In the Horn of Africa, Al Shabaab continues to attract attention as arguably the continent’s most prominent terrorist organisation both in terms of its links with Al Qaeda and its ability to strike at western targets or targets considered as sympathetic to the western cause or detrimental to Islam. While it is deemed as an outgrowth of the Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI), a radical organisation that confronted the Siad Bare regime in the early 1990s, in 2003 it began its operation as the enforcing arm of the Union of Islamic Courts (ICU), when the latter took control over Mogadishu and tried to exert a level of law and order in the Somali capital that is most notable. Following the Ethiopian intervention in December 2006, ICU was all but disbanded except for the Al Shabaab that withdrew to the south Central region of the country and launched what has become a long running insurgency first, against the Ethiopians and subsequently, troops serving under the African Union Mission in Somalia. While its objective resonates as the creation of an Islamic State of Somalia, its affiliation with Al Qaeda has meant that the group has also sought to hit targets deemed as affronts to the global jihad currently been pursued by Al Qaeda and its affiliates. The trend of terrorism around the continent is instructive of the intensifying wave of Islamic fundamentalism and the possibility of generating and sustaining training camps and recruits akin to the challenges confronted in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It also justifies the renewed focus of the US on Africa. NEGOTIATING DRONES FOR AFRICA The dynamics of terrorism in Africa are not lost to US policy makers. However, since the Somalia debacle in 1993, the US appears to have conceded to its relative weaknesses on the continent (Adebajo, 2003). This is related to the fact that it was not a colonial power and its actions on the continent during the Cold War were mostly limited to covert operations championed by the CIA. The history of US actions in Africa has therefore been more of covert ‘drone-like’ operations than open warfare such as witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The current hyper predilection for drones in the US strategy is in line with the Obama Administration’s “light footprints” and ‘leading from behind policy’. Admittedly, the adoption of drones is confronted by some controversies. This can be compared to those surrounding waterboarding and other interrogation techniques applied in US detention facilities (Bellamy, 2006). Unfortunately, the debate on the utility of drones in the context of terrorism is significantly challenged by what can best be described as the ‘Pak Syndrome’. This is the reality that debates on the utility of drones are heavily influenced by their application to the war on terror in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Consequently, the application of drones are confronted by utility-blighting propaganda that merely portray drones as killer devices and negates the intelligence gathering and surveillance relevance and the impact of such intelligence to the war on terror. This includes the fact that the intelligence gathered potentially leads to the prevention of even more strikes, and by implication, more deaths by terrorists. The Pak syndrome also dilutes the complementary capacity of drones in the war on terror by highlighting legal conundrums particularly focusing on issues concerning the responsibility to fair trial for suspects and the application of principles of humanitarian law (Alston, 2010 & Sadat,2012) among others. These objections are often overrated and do not aptly reflect the reality that the war on terror is unconventional in many respects. Moreover, certain aspects of the African context peculiarly requires the utility of drones. In arguing the veracity of the latter, it is submitted that an analysis of the trend of terrorism in Africa, points to some continent-wide commonalities from the use of guerilla tactics, the exploitation of large expanses of geographical areas and the implications of Africa’s infamous porous borders on the activities of terrorist organisations. While these illuminate the nature of the terrorist threat in Africa, it is also suggestive of the strategies that are likely to make an impact in relation to managing the phenomenon of terrorism on the continent. A number of these commonalities and their implications for drone use are examined herein. A pronounced feature of the new wars relating to terrorism in Africa is the guerilla tactics (Onuoha, 2011) employed by the various terrorist organisations on the continent. The implication is that timeless principles of war, as espoused by the Geneva and Hague conventions, for instance, are not being adhered to. For Boko Haram, Ansar Dine, AQIM and Al Shabaab for instance, civilian targets are legitimate targets and so are injured US soldiers. The weapons of choice for terrorists have been decided more by availability and less by restrictions of Jus in Bello. A stark reminder of the abuse of legal principles is the attack on the US consulate in Benghazi, Libya, which, needless to say, was a violation of the inviolability of diplomatic premises; one of the preeminent provisions of post-Westphalia diplomatic relations. The tendency for non-state parties or their state sponsors to adhere to these rules of war undoubtedly points to the presence of an asymmetrical war. Unfortunately, the US is bound to largely adhere to the rules that terrorist organisations, herein considered as unconventional combatants, flout with impunity. In such an unfavorably unbalanced terrain, positive outcomes from the use of conventional security operatives even with regard to intelligence-gathering is dodgy. Africa’s disreputably porous borders and the prospects they offer for trans-regional terrorism is another reason why unconventional interventions by the US should be contemplated. As noted above, almost all the Islamic fundamentalist groups straddle entire regions with relative ease. In the case of Mali, it has been indicated, for instance, that porous borders to the North have facilitated the migration of fighters from Algeria-based AQIM as well as vestiges of the Libyan conflict to move in and operate with reasonable ease. The fact of mercenaries crossing the porous borders of Africa means that mobilising terror for cross-country objectives of hitting US and Western interests is made much easier (Dehez, 2010). The expanse of territory straddled, the multiplicity of countries operated in and the implications on sovereignty that the US will have to be confronted with in pursuit of terrorist and networks makes it more difficult for conventional forces to gather terrorism-related intelligence. On the contrary, the reconnaissance capacity of drones makes them ultimately efficient strategies in monitoring the flow of terrorist networks and illicit weapons as well as building of training camps in Africa. Thus essentially, managing the long porous borders could therefore benefit from the surveillance capabilities of drones. Related to the above is the lack of capacity of most African governments to gather and organise unimpeachable intelligence on the activities of terrorists and their networks. A number of factors account for this reality. The obvious being the lack of political commitment as manifested in the inability of governments to commit funds for developing intelligence databases countrywide and across regions. Additionally, terrorist organisations in Africa are operating on multiple fronts, adopting mutating strategies and enlisting combatants whose identities are at the least amorphous. This makes the collection of intelligence difficult and by implication, makes these wars generally less responsive to conventional deterrence strategies. In the absence of such intelligence, countries currently confronted heavily by the activities of terrorism such as Nigeria and Mali are having to depend on inadequate or inexistent intelligence to fight what is in reality, a lost battle ab initio (Amaraegbu, 2013). From the determination of terrorist cells to the identification of key members and their arrest or execution, the reality is that the war on terror is fought more on intelligence and less on brute force. As such, the utility of the surveillance and intelligence-gathering capacity of drones to African governments grappling with terrorism cannot be over-emphasised. The proliferation of weapons in Africa also makes it impossible to gauge the strategic or tactical ability of terrorist organisations. This could lead to significant miscalculations with unpredictable consequences. Particularly in Libya, where the revolutionary forces violently confronted the Gadhafi regime, the end of the war has hardly seen any meaningful programme of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of former combatants. A number of combatants also alluded to pro-US sentiments for as long as Gadhafi was the enemy, a simple case of the enemy of my enemy being my friend. The implications of this could be obvious - the existence of many armed people fluid enough to be manipulated, proliferated arms and a growing fundamentalist rhetoric that can be mobilised for running terrorist objectives. A critical component of the US assistance to Africa as regards the war on terror must therefore relate to intelligence gathering and dissemination. The surveillance capabilities of drones are absolutely needed in these circumstances (Drew, 2010). Related to the intelligence deficit in most African countries is an infrastructural deficit that can forestall the progress of conventional troops yet can be effectively harnessed by radical groups employing guerilla-style tactics. With vast land areas virtually undeveloped, such as the Sahel Sahara region, conventional military tactics will be confronted by accessibility challenges. Such terrain however favors the guerilla tactics of Africa’s terror networks who are prone to exploit such vulnerability of conventional troops through kidnapping and suicide bombings among others. Drones on the other hand, are comparatively less prone by design to the hazards of Africa’s infrastructural deficit. In this light, drones can better overcome Africa’s infrastructural challenges to provide surveillance and intelligence data on terrorism. Finally, one of the components of the war on terror since 2001 has been America’s desire to win hearts and minds. Within the African continent, the US reputation appears to have floundered. Indeed, in terms of security, America’s record suggests an opportunistic actor interested in the continent during the Cold War days yet quick to demarcate its interests in the aftermath of the Cold War. While this is undoubtedly symptomatic of the wiles of global politics, the re-entry of the US to Africa’s security affairs based mainly on the assessed effects of African-bred terrorism and its impact on US national security should be approached with extreme caution, less funfair and more discretion. Under the circumstances, what is required is a less visible approach to intervention, one that favors the stealth operations of drones. CONSIDERING THE ANTI-DRONE SCHOOL The argument has been made that using drones against terrorists is not the most lasting way to fight the enemy. To the holders of this opinion, the targeted-killing of terrorists does not deter their fomentation. If a top operative is killed, for instance, it is just a matter of time before he is replaced. Also, the point is made that the more terrorists are attacked with drones, the more they pursue a correction of the asymmetry by targeting innocent civilians as they are in no position to hit back at the drones or their operators (Whetham, 2013). Consequently, it is argued that, to effectively fight terrorism particularly in Africa, the human insecurity generators of terrorism must be eliminated or at least, reduced considerably through transparency and accountability as well as equitable distribution of the national cake to primarily reduce internal dissent likely to fuel insurgencies. This position is sound and undoubtedly reflective of the multivariate causes of terrorism in Africa. As indicated above, for instance, the post-independence corruption and mal-governance-filled narratives of the Africa State is proven to be one of the creators of terrorism in Africa. It therefore stands to reason that the search for strategies takes into consideration aspects that rectify the challenges indicated above. Unfortunately, part of the local dynamics influencing terrorism on the continent may point to the ineffectiveness of such human security and governance-inspired strategy. Presently, for instance, the leitmotif for Africa-based terrorists has shifted or is shifting from out-and-out domestic concerns to a hard lined anti-west agenda. In such a situation, one can only be dodgy about whether the terrorists remain interested in pressurising their home governments into pursuing good governance. If governance in Nigeria improves, for instance, will Boko Haram disband? Will the group abort its objective of de-secularisation of the state? In responding in the negative, this paper suggests the presence on the continent, some terrorist organisations whose evolution and motive have no relation to Africa’s governance challenges, or who have moved beyond those challenges to represent a global jihad against the West and values largely considered as of western orientation. Thus, in reality, such terrorists are a bunch of ‘all or nothing’ intransigent killers not willing to meet anybody halfway and as such can hardly be satisfied through negotiations or good governance. This unfortunately reduces the human security and governance-inspired strategies to effective add-ons to multidimensional strategies much the same way as drones. As Olojo (2013) points out, the sources and causes of terrorism in Africa are multiple in nature and as such the best way to counter terrorism on the continent is to pursue a multi-dimensional approach. Using drones as part of the cocktail of strategies for confronting terrorism in Africa must factor in the Pak syndrome. Civilian deaths and abuse of territorial sovereignty resulting from drone usage are legitimate concerns. Notwithstanding, they are bearable opportunity costs in the war on terrorism. Although the death of non-combatants cannot be justified in absolute terms, comparatively, incidents of terrorism are resulting in the death of more civilians than American drones have accidentally killed. Moreover, the point has been made that the civilian-casualties argument against drone usage has largely arisen due to the well-publicised quality of ‘precision’ drones are supposed to have. Thus, even one civilian casualty is seen as a preventable case. Such a standard cannot be achieved by any ground combat operation. Beyond the attack functions, the intelligence-gathering utility of drones is a practical tool to fight terrorism in Africa. For instance, after Boko Haram abducted about 200 girls from a high school in Chibok, China offered help by providing satellite imagery to help Nigeria track the location of the abductees. America supported with same, as well as surveillance, intelligence and reconnaissance assets. The excellence of these capacities is undoubtedly essential to combatting terrorist attacks such as the Chibok kidnapping incident.

**Africa is at a unique risk of nuclear theft because of poor security and porous borders – strong terrorist organizations will conduct nuclear terrorism**

**Mutua 15** – John-Mark Mutua, former Lecturer at Egerton University, International Relations and Politics Tutor at University of the Witwatersrand, 2015 (“Uranium yellowcake trafficking incidents in Africa: Proliferation threat or non-proliferation opportunity?” *African Security Review*, Volume 24, Issue 2, Taylor & Francis Online, June 5th)

But that was almost a decade ago. A combination of factors may have eased the illicit acquisition of Africa's vulnerable uranium yellowcake for further concealed processing, enrichment and fabrication of crude nuclear weapons by sophisticated rogue non-state actors: the emergence of well-off terrorist/jihadist groups keen on stealing, buying or building a nuclear bomb; robust safeguards of nuclear warheads, fissile material and their facilities yet poor securing of uranium yellowcake, particularly in Africa; the relative ease of trafficking uranium yellowcake, which is less radioactive per unit mass, across ill-secured African ports and borders; the proliferation of nuclear-weapons-related information and technological expertise (i.e., sophisticated nuclear scientists/engineers, precision computer-aided centrifuge-part manufacturing machines, basic Chinese enrichment technology,17 etc.); and an increase in largely ungoverned terrorist-ridden zones in North, West, Central and East Africa, which provide the perfect location for weapons development, testing and launch.18

Africa's yellowcake proliferation threat may have been further compounded by the continent's lack of political will and capacity to enforce nuclear material safeguards, the sidelining of the continent from an array of international nuclear security initiatives keen on securing fissile material and enrichment or reprocessing technology, and a projected increase in uranium developments in Africa that may be accompanied by a parallel surge in yellowcake trafficking incidents on the continent, assuming the current yellowcake proliferation concerns remain unchecked. While organised rogue non-state actors would encounter significant, but not insurmountable, challenges in developing fissile material and fabricating crude nuclear devices, the catastrophic public health, environmental, and politico-economic implications of the above-mentioned actors’ successful detonation of crude or fully fledged nuclear weapons, acquired via the tedious yellowcake pathway, should provide little room for complacency.

**Terror defense is wrong – high risk of nuclear attacks.**

**Zimmerman 09** – (2009, Peter, PhD, experimental nuclear and elementary particle physics, Emeritus Professor of Science and Security at King's College London, former Chief Scientist of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Do We Really Need to Worry? Some Reflections on the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism,” Defence Against Terrorism Review Vol. 2, No. 2, Fall 2009, 1-14)

Abstract: This paper considers the case for and against there being a substantial risk that a sub-state adversary might be able to carry the construction of a nuclear device to completion and delivery. It discusses works both for and against the proposition that the detonation of an improvised nuclear device (IND) or a stolen nuclear weapon is sufficiently probable that strong measures to prevent the act must be considered. Contrarian articles and books have appeared suggesting that the possibility of nuclear terrorism has been greatly exaggerated. They argue that building an IND is too difficult for even well-financed terrorists, that obtaining sufficient fissile materials is nearly impossible, and that no intact weapons will be stolen. But a**n examination of these works finds some to be simplistic and ridden with basic mistakes in risk analysis or misconceptions**, while others are better informed but still flawed. The principal barrier to entry for either a new nuclear weapons possessor state or a sub-state group, namely acquiring fissile material, plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU), became less imposing with the collapse of the Soviet Union. There is a gap in our knowledge of Russian fissile inventories, which have not always been well guarded, and in this circumstance one cannot reassure the world that there has been no theft of fissile material, or that any attempt will be detected quickly enough to prevent its being made into a nuclear device. The probability of a nuclear terrorist attack in any given year remains significant. **Significant investment to deter, prevent, detect, and destroy a nuclear terror plot is required**.

**Nuclear terror causes accidental US-Russia nuclear war.**

**Barrett et al. 2013** – (6/28, Anthony, PhD, Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon University, Director of Research, Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, Fellow in the RAND Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows Program, Seth Baum, PhD, Geography, Pennsylvania State University, Executive Director, GCRI, Research Scientist at the Blue Marble Space Institute of Science, former Visiting Scholar position at the Center for Research on Environmental Decisions at Columbia University, and Kelly Hostetler, Research Assistant, GCRI, “Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia,” Science and Global Security 21(2): 106-133, pre-print, available online)

War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which are by far the largest of any nations, **could have globally catastrophic effects** such as severely reducing food production for years,1 potentially leading to collapse of modern civilization worldwide and even the **extinction of humanity**.2 Nuclear war between the United States and Russia could occur by various routes, including accidental or unauthorized launch; deliberate first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on accurate information about the state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack.3 (Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve intentional manipulation of risks from otherwise accidental or inadvertent launches.4 )

Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack through development of deterrence capabilities, though numerous measures were also taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. For purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a subsequent counterattack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the other side’s forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides’ development of capabilities to detect a first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage from the first attack.5

Many people believe that with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations between the United States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war was significantly reduced.6 However, it has also been argued that **inadvertent nuclear war between the United States and Russia has continue**d **to present a substantial risk**.7 While the United States and Russia are not actively threatening each other with war, they have remained ready to launch nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack.8

False indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways. First, a wide range of events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded at the wrong time.9 Second, terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks on either the United States or Russia that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation by actions such as exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear bomb,10 especially if such an event occurs during a crisis between the United States and Russia.11 A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are possible.12 Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or construct nuclear weapons and to use them against the United States.13 Other methods could involve attempts to circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their security.14

It has long been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is significantly higher during U.S.-Russian crisis conditions,15 with the Cuban Missile Crisis being a prime historical example. **It is possible that U.S.-Russian relations will significantly deteriorate in the future, increasing nuclear tensions**. There are a variety of ways for a third party to raise tensions between the United States and Russia, making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks.16

**Even without retaliation a small attack causes nuclear winter and mass death.**

**Toon et al. 07** – (2007, Owen, PhD from Cornell, Director and Professor, Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences Fellow, Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics (LASP) University of Colorado, Boulder, Alan Robock, PhD from MIT, Professor II Department of Environmental Sciences School of Environmental and Biological Sciences Rutgers University, R. P. Turco, C. Bardeen, L. Oman, and G. L. Stenchikov, “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conﬂicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism,” Atmos. Chem. Phys., 7, 1973–2002, 2007)

To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that **a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million**. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufﬁcient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conﬂict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic consequences. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and **terrorists would be most likely to strike there**. Accordingly, an organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such a state, **could generate casualties comparable to those once predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conﬂict**. Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to signiﬁcant global climate perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.

**Jackson is wrong.**

**Horgan and Boyle 08** (John and Michael, Associate Professor of Psychology at Penn State and Assistant Professor of Political Science at LaSalle University, “A Case Against ‘Critical Terrorism Studies’” Critical Studies on Terrorism, Volume 1, Issue 1, 2008, pages 51-64)

One of the tensions within CTS concerns the issue of ‘policy relevance’. At the most basic level, there are some sweeping generalizations made by CTS scholars, often with little evidence. For example, Jackson (2007c) describes ‘the core terrorism scholars’ (without explicitly saying who he is referring to) as ‘intimately connected – institutionally, financially, politically, and ideologically – with a state hegemonic project’ (p. 245). Without giving any details of who these ‘core’ scholars are, where they are, what they do, and exactly who funds them, his arguments are tantamount to conjecture at best. We do not deny that governments fund terrorism research and terrorism researchers, and that this can influence the direction (and even the findings) of the research. But we are suspicious of over-generalizations of this count on two grounds: (1) accepting government funding or information does not necessarily obviate one's independent scholarly judgment in a particular project; and (2) having policy relevance is not always a sin. On the first point, we are in agreement with some CTS scholars. Gunning provides a sensitive analysis of this problem, and calls on CTS advocates to come to terms with how they can engage policy-makers without losing their critical distance. He recognizes that CTS can (and should) aim to be policy-relevant, but perhaps to a different audience, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society than just governments and security services. In other words, CTS aims to whisper into the ear of the prince, but it is just a different prince. Gunning(2007a) also argues that research should be assessed on its own merits, for ‘just because a piece of research comes from RAND does not invalidate it; conversely, a “critical” study is not inherently good’ (p. 240). We agree entirely with this. Not all sponsored or contract research is made to ‘toe a party line’, and much of the work coming out of official government agencies or affiliated government agencies has little agenda and can be analytically useful. The task of the scholar is to retain one's sense of critical judgment and integrity, and we believe that there is no prima facie reason to assume that this cannot be done in sponsored research projects. What matters here are the details of the research – what is the purpose of the work, how will it be done, how might the work be used in policy – and for these questions the scholar must be self-critical and insistent on their intellectual autonomy. The scholar must also be mindful of the responsibility they bear for shaping a government's response to the problem of terrorism. Nothing – not the source of the funding, purpose of the research or prior empirical or theoretical commitment – obviates the need of the scholar to consider his or her own conscience carefully when engaging in work with any external actor. But simply engaging with governments on discrete projects does not make one an ‘embedded expert’ nor does it imply sanction to their actions.

But we also believe that the study of political violence lends itself to policy relevance and that those who seek to produce research that might help policy-makers reduce the rates of terrorist attack are committing no sin, provided that they retain their independent judgment and report their findings candidly and honestly. In the case of terrorism, we would go further to argue that being policy relevant is in some instances an entirely justifiable moral choice. For example, neither of us has any problem producing research with a morally defensible but policy relevant goal (for example, helping the British government to prevent suicide bombers from attacking the London Underground) and we do not believe that engaging in such work tarnishes one's stature as an independent scholar. Implicit in the CTS literature is a deep suspicion about the state and those who engage with it. Such a suspicion may blind some CTS scholars to good work done by those associated with the state. But to assume that being ‘embedded’ in an institution linked to the ‘establishment’ consists of being captured by a state hegemonic project is too simple. We do not believe that scholars studying terrorism must all be policy-relevant, but equally we do not believe that being policy relevant should always be interpreted as writing a blank cheque for governments or as necessarily implicating the scholar in the behaviour of that government on issues unrelated to one's work. Working for the US government, for instance, does not imply that the scholar sanctions or approves of the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison. The assumption that those who do not practice CTS are all ‘embedded’ with the ‘establishment’ and that this somehow gives the green light for states to engage in illegal activity is in our view unwarranted, to say the very least. The limits of this moral responsibility are overlooked in current CTS work; indeed, if anything there is an attempt to inflate the policy relevance that terrorism scholars have. Jackson (2007c) alleges that ‘the direction of domestic counter-terrorism policies’ are ‘to a large degree based on orthodox terrorism studies research’ (p. 225). Yet he provides no examples, let alone evidence for this claim. Jackson further alleges ‘terrorism studies actually provides an authoritative judgment about who may legitimately be killed, tortured, rendered or incarcerated by the state in the name of counter-terrorism’ (p. 249). Again, there is a tension here: Jackson conjures an image of terrorism studies which no matter its conceptual and empirical flaws is somehow able to influence governments to the point of constructing who is and is not a legitimate target. This implies that not only is there a secret cabal of terrorism researchers quietly pulling the strings of government, but also that those engaged in terrorism research sanction abuse of human rights and state-directed violence. This implies a measure of bad faith on the part of some terrorism researchers, and we believe that CTS advocates should offer a more nuanced portrayal of those engaged in policy relevant search than this assessment allows.

**Terrorists want nuclear weapons.**

**Phillips 12** – (2012, Andrew, PhD, Senior Lecturer in the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland, “Horsemen of the apocalypse? Jihadist strategy and nuclear instability in South Asia,” International Politics (2012) 49, 297–317)

Jihadism and the enduring appeal of nuclear weapons

Jihadists have long sought to acquire and use WMD – including nuclear weapons – against Western targets. Al Qaeda has reportedly possessed a WMD research branch within its organisation since the early 1990s (Scheuer, 2006, p. 7), while revelations that Al Qaeda representatives met with Pakistani nuclear scientists in August 2001 proved pivotal in galvanising the Bush Administration's fears concerning the potential for terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons after 9/11 (Suskind, 2006, pp. 61–62; Bunn, 2009, p. 113; Albright, 2010, pp. 178–179). Jihadist furthermore propaganda routinely tallies the Muslim victims of infidel injustice in the millions, situating this lamentation alongside a corresponding call for the jihadists to inflict revenge on a proportionate scale against the West (Al-Fahd, 2003, p. 8). The May 2003 fatwa of an influential radical Saudi cleric authorising as halal (religiously permissible) the use of WMD against Western targets further reveals the extent to which jihadists have sought to pre-emptively shape public opinion in the Islamic world in ways that might be conducive towards greater Muslim acceptance of any jihadist WMD attack against the West (Salama and Hansell, 2005, p. 627). Finally, the seriousness with which counter-terrorism experts judge the jihadist nuclear threat is underscored by the Obama administration's nomination of nuclear terrorism as the greatest immediate threat to global security (Bunn, 2009, p. 112).

The jihadist fixation with WMD – and especially nuclear weapons – is thus a matter of public record, and the jihadist nuclear attraction is likely to intensify in the light of the jihadists’ setbacks in the ‘war on terror’ sketched above. Jihadist motivations to strike either America or one of its close allies with a nuclear weapon echo those that drove both the 9/11 attacks as well as a host of other mass-casualty attacks planned or perpetrated against Western targets since 2001. The desire to sow fear in the polities they deem responsible for Muslims’ oppression; the hope that a mass-casualty attack might provoke the West into a disproportionate response that may then draw the faithful to fight under the jihadist banner; the expectation that a blow sufficiently painful might compel the West to abandon its support for its client states by withdrawing from the Greater Middle East and South Asia – each of these motivations are likely to inform jihadist nuclear aspirations. **An assessment of jihadists’ past behaviour and an evaluation of the movement's bleak prospects absent a system-destabilising shock to restore its fortunes all point to a revived interest in nuclear weapons being one of the most likely future developments in jihadist circles in coming years**. In the light of this evidence, Western counter-terrorism officials have naturally concentrated on the threat of direct nuclear jihadist terrorist attacks on Western targets. However, while I would agree that this remains the jihadists’ preferred method of advancing their objectives, an alternative outlet for jihadist nuclear aspirations lies in an effort to provoke an Indo–Pakistani nuclear confrontation with a view towards profiting from the ensuing chaos. This reasoning supporting this assessment is outlined below.

# case

**Struct viol too generalized and can’t be solved**

**Boulding 77** Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung Author(s): Kenneth E. BouldingReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1977), pp. 75-86Published Kenneth Ewart Boulding (January 18, 1910 – March 18, 1993) was an economist, educator, peace activist, poet, religious mystic, devoted Quaker, systems scientist, and interdisciplinary philosopher.[1][2] He was cofounder of General Systems Theory and founder of numerous ongoing intellectual projects in economics and social science. He graduated from Oxford University, and was granted United States citizenship in 1948. During the years 1949 to 1967, he was a faculty member of the University of Michigan. In 1967, he joined the faculty of the University of Colorado at Boulder, where he remained until his retirement.

Finally, we come to the great Galtung metaphors of 'structural violence' 'and 'positive peace'. They are metaphors rather than models, and for that very reason are suspect. Metaphors always imply models and metaphors have much more persuasive power than models do, for models tend to be the preserve of the specialist. But when a metaphor implies a bad model it can be very dangerous, for it is both persuasive and wrong. The metaphor of structural violence I would argue falls right into this category. The metaphor is that poverty, deprivation, ill health, low expectations of life, a condition in which more than half the human race lives, is 'like' a thug beating up the victim and 'taking his money away from him in the street, or it is 'like' a conqueror stealing the land of the people and reducing them to slavery. The implication is that poverty and its associated ills are the fault of the thug or the conqueror and the solution is to do away with thugs and conquerors. While there is some truth in the metaphor, in the modern world at least there is not very much. Violence, whether of the streets and the home, or of the guerilla, of the police, or of the armed forces, is a very different phenomenon from poverty. The processes which create and sustain poverty are not at all like the processes which create and sustain violence, although like everything else in 'the world, everything is somewhat related to everything else. There is a very real problem of the structures which lead to violence, but unfortunately Galitung's metaphor of structural violence as he has used it has diverted attention from this problem. Violence in the behavioral sense, that is, somebody actually doing damage to somebody else and trying to make them worse off, is a 'threshold' phenomenon, rather like the boiling over of a pot. The temperature under a pot can rise for a long time without its boiling over, but at some 'threshold boiling over will take place. The study of the structures which underlie violence are a very important and much neglected part of peace research and indeed of social science in general. Threshold phenomena like violence are difficult to study because they represent 'breaks' in the systenm rather than uniformities. Violence, whether between persons or organizations, occurs when the 'strain' on a system is too great for its 'strength'. The metaphor here is that violence is like what happens when we break a piece of chalk. Strength and strain, however, especially in social systems, are so interwoven historically that it is very difficult to separate them. The diminution of violence involves two possible strategies, or a mixture of the two; one is Ithe increase in the strength of the system, 'the other is the diminution of the strain. The strength of systems involves habit, culture, taboos, and sanctions, all these 'things which enable a system to stand lincreasing strain without breaking down into violence. The strains on the system 'are largely dynamic in character, such as arms races, mutually stimulated hostility, changes in relative economic position or political power, which are often hard to identify. Conflicts of interest 'are only part 'of the strain on a system, and not always the most important part. It is very hard for people ito know their interests, and misperceptions of 'interest take place mainly through the dynamic processes, not through the structural ones. It is only perceptions of interest which affect people's behavior, not the 'real' interests, whatever these may be, and the gap between percepti'on and reality can be very large and resistant to change. However, what Galitung calls structural violence (which has been defined 'by one unkind commenltator as anything that Galitung doesn't like) was originally defined as any unnecessarily low expectation of life, on that assumption that anybody who dies before the allotted span has been killed, however unintentionally and unknowingly, by somebody else. The concept has been expanded to include all 'the problems of poverty, destitution, deprivation, and misery. These are enormously real and are a very high priority for research and action, but they belong to systems which are only peripherally related to 'the structures whi'ch produce violence. This is not rto say that the cultures of violence and the cultures of poverty are not sometimes related, though not all poverty cultures are cultures of violence, and certainly not all cultures of violence are poverty cultures. But the dynamics lof poverty and the success or failure to rise out of it are of a complexity far beyond anything which the metaphor of structural violence can offer. While the metaphor of structural violence performed a service in calling attention to a problem, it may have d'one a disservice in preventing us from finding the answer.

**Security contractors cause American re-intervention to stop crises - turns aff**

**McFate and Gilsinan 15**

(Kathy Gilsinan of the Atlantic interviewing Sean McFate, Associate Prof. at the National Defense University, “The Return of the Mercenary” March 25 2015, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/03/return-of-the-mercenary/388616/>) //Baylor

Gilsinan: Did it ever really go away? McFate: Mercenaries were always a part of the system, just in the 19th century and 20th century when the Westphalian system was at its zenith, they went underground, it became [a] black market for mercenaries. And we saw them come up in the ‘50s and ‘60s during the African wars of decolonization, but they were very taboo. It wasn’t until after the Cold War that we started to see them become more public, the famous one being Executive Outcomes in South Africa. And now we’re starting to see real mercenaries appearing all over the world in conflict markets. Extractive industries are hiring them, NGOs are hiring them, someday the UN might hire them. As Americans, we think of it as an American phenomenon. It’s not. These companies, at least the last 10 years, they had American faces, but when I was in DynCorp doing this type of work, a lot of my colleagues were from all over the world. And we’re seeing a proliferation around the world, we’re seeing ex-Latin American special forces showing up in the Gulf States. Gilsinan: That gets to the question of **what happens when they go home**. McFate: What happens after the contract, right? That’s always the question. Some will stay in place, look for new opportunities, or make **new opportunities**, which happened in the Middle Ages. In the case of these private military companies in Afghanistan and Iraq, a lot of those people came from around the world, they go home to, say, Guatemala, and they can start their own private military company there. We’re also seeing warlords in these places model themselves as private military companies. The end of the book talks about what this will look like, and I call it "durable disorder." A world that will have mercenaries in it will be a world with more war, because mercenaries are incentivized to do that. Gilsinan: More war but smaller wars? McFate: Yes. It won’t be like World War III. We call this irregular war, but that’s a misnomer. There’s no such thing as regular versus irregular war, that’s a real Westphalian construction. Most of the wars around the world are dirty, nasty, elongated, in the mud, [smaller] scale. And that’s what’s going to be stoked. Now the question is, can a mercenary outfit **suck the U.S. into a war** someplace? In 2008, when Mia Farrow wanted to hire Blackwater to stage a humanitarian intervention in Darfur, one of the concerns was, if an American person hired a private military company to go into Darfur, could that draw the U.S. into a war with Sudan? And the answer is, **of course it could**. That group of people at that point was pretty circumspect, but I can imagine a future where some crazy tycoon hires a private military company to do something outrageous that is for a good cause, but something happens and now the U.S. has got to go rescue people, or stop a situation from getting worse. Technology allows [private armed groups] to **punch above their weight class.** And technology’s ever cheaper, ever more available, and so drones and other types of technologies—weapons systems, night-vision goggles—that’s all on the open market as well. So we’ve got an open market for force, swishing around with these markets of technologies. Supply and demand are going to find each other, and that allows **a very small group of people to do some big damage.**

**Countries will shift to European PMCs which are more dangerous**

**Hughes 12**

(Emma Hughes and Mika Minio-Paluello, A SECRET SUBSIDY Oil companies, the Navy & the response to piracy, a briefing paper of Platform, http://platformlondon.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/A-Secret-Subsidy-piracy.pdf)

Recently the shipping industry has been lobbying for even more influence. The Chamber of Shipping has called for the UK navy to provide teams of naval or military personnel, called Vessel Protection Detachments (VPDs), to be placed on board their commercial vessels.25 In effect the industry wants the navy to act as private security guards.

While VPDs are not yet used in the UK, some other countries have begun renting their military personnel out to private corporations. The Dutch government has been providing units to escort ships for the last year, but plans to increase this service by deploying 100 teams of ten people this year. Total costs for the Dutch teams are estimated at US$29m but the shipping companies are only expected to pay half of this, leaving the Dutch government to make up the US$14.5m shortfall.26 Hiring out navy personnel to private companies at a reduced fee, or even for free, means the public sector is subsidising corporations’ security costs at a time of spending cutbacks. Companies’ private use of military personnel raises a range of legal and political questions. As James Brown, military fellow of the Lowry Institute, observes, putting national military personnel under the control of a commercial ship captain “essentially makes a commercial vessel a warship”.27

Although the use of VPDs is fairly new, there has already been one incident demonstrating the potential dangers. In February 2012 two Italian marines were placed as VPDs on board oil tanker MV Enrica Lexie. While serving on the tanker they shot, and killed, two Indian fishermen that they incorrectly suspected of piracy. The incident sparked a diplomatic row between India and Italy. Both of the Italian marines were arrested by the Indian police and are now being held in a southern Indian jail awaiting trial for murder.28

The lack of transparent information on VPNs means that exact figures are hard to get, but Brown estimates that there are plans for more than 2,000 European military personnel to be privately hired to shipping as vessel protection detachments. If governments continue to hire out, or simply gift, their national military to act as security guards, such international disputes, with serious implications for the military personnel involved, will undoubtedly increase. It also means that naval deployment is increasingly led by the interests of those corporations best connected with the establishment, or most able to pay.

How have oil and gas companies secured this influence?

Since the Sirius star was hijacked in 2008 and insurance premiums began rising, the shipping industry has presented itself as under attack. Previous Vice-President of Shell Shipping Jan Kopernicki, who was simultaneously president of the British Chamber of Shipping, argued that there was a “gaping hole in the UK’s defence strategy” and demanded that David Cameron increase naval spending to bring forward the acquisition of a new generation of warships currently scheduled for 2020.29 Shell’s public interventions – meant to embarrass and pressure the Ministry of Defence - came in the context of public austerity cuts hitting millions of people. Kopernicki was in effect demanding a reallocation of funds from schools, the NHS, or other parts of the military, to the sector most important to Shell’s profit margin.

Jan Kopernicki was succeeded by Dr Grahaeme Henderson as the Director of Shell’s International Trading and Shipping company. His career with Shell has included posts in Syria and Nigeria; countries where Shell’s support for repressive regimes has resulted in increased human rights abuses.30 Henderson describes himself as ‘a leading industry spokesperson on piracy’. In addition to working for Shell, he is also Chair of the British Chamber of Shipping’s Defence and Security Committee and Co-chair of the UK’s Shipping Defence Advisory Committee, a joint industry and government committee that coordinates military and commercial interests. Henderson, like Kopernicki, occupies a number of positions that mean he is assured access to government ministers and senior military personnel.

Kopernicki’s argument for deploying more troops to the seas off Somalia was that “the UK’s economic security depends on energy security: without enough energy, the economy simply cannot keep going.” This is a purposeful distortion in relation to Somalia, as it relies on flawed assumptions as to the source of Britain’s energy, the types of energy required to keep the economy going, how the economy functions – and even the direction of Shell’s shipments passing Somalia. In November 2010 Kopernicki said, “I don’t want to be alarmist but I provide transport for essential oil and gas for this country and I want to be sure that the lights are on in Birmingham, my home city”.31 This argument was disingenuous as very little of the oil and gas moved through the Gulf of Aden is destined for Britain. Disruptions in the flow of crude will not affect the lights in Birmingham, as oil is not converted into electricity in Britain. In addition gas transported by sea – Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) - currently only makes up one per cent of Britain’s energy mix and is therefore unlikely to provide much in the way of ‘security’ should other sources become temporarily scarce or compromised. While Shell shipments of oil and gas passing Somalia do not play a significant role in Britain’s energy mix, they are highly relevant to Shell’s positioning as a global oil trader. Private Military Security / Mercenary Companies:

Private military and security companies (PMSCs) – mercenaries – have jumped at the commercial opportunities presented by the situation off Somalia**.** As with VPNs, the deployment of private armed guards on commercial ships raises many concerns.

Maritime military service companies are estimated to take $52.2mn per month for militarising approximately 1500 journeys.32 This growth has led many to raise concerns about the quality of contractors, with even the shipping industry acknowledging the ‘significant competence and quality variations...across the spectrum of contractors’.33 Some of the companies involved have track records that demonstrate that they should not be trusted with these private military contracts. G4S has described piracy-related maritime military services as a ‘big commercial opportunity’34 and are now maritime military providers.35 The company infamously failed to provide the required number of security staff for the London 2012 Olympics. It has a record of more fatal behaviour, including allowing multiple detainees to die in its custody.36 In 2009 it hired Danny Fitzsimmons to work as a member of military staff in Iraq despite receiving warnings about his mental health. Within hours of arriving in Iraq Fitzsimmons killed two other colleagues.37 Such a liturgy of mistakes demonstrates that G4S are not a suitable provider of maritime security.

The legal status of armed PMSCs is unclear. British private military companies ignore UK laws to exploit this business opportunity.38 Rather then prosecuting these companies the government has chosen to try to legalise the use of private armed guards. In 2011 it was announced that the government would legalise the use of Private Armed Security Guards (PASGs) on ships travelling through the Red Sea or Gulf of Aden, even though this may break the laws of the countries the ships are travelling through; Egypt and South Africa have already objected.39

The Foreign Affairs Committee concluded that allowing armed guards on ships could escalate violence as it may encourage an arms race with pirates, increasing the weapons they carry to match the armed guards.40 For vessels transporting flammable material, like LNG carriers and oil tankers, having armed guards is a huge risk.

**Withdraw leads to military aid for proxy AMISOM forces**

**Bruton and Pham 12** – Bronwyn Bruton, deputy director of the Atlantic Council's Africa Center in Washington, D.C., Peter Pham, Director of the Atlantic Council's Africa Center, 2012 (“The Splintering of Al Shabaab,” *Atlantic Council*, February 2nd, <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-splintering-of-al-shabaab> | ADM)

That is why quelling the insurgency has fallen entirely on AMISOM. Over the last 18 months or so the 12,000 strong force has honed its tactics and made gains, however stilting, against al Shabaab. Insistent that no American boots hit the ground in Somalia, Washington has backed the mission. (That is, of course, no American boots on the ground with the exception of last week, when a Navy Seal team rescued two aid workers in central Somalia, some 500 kilometers north of Mogadishu.) In return for their troop contributions to AMISOM, the United States has given Burundi and Uganda several hundred million dollars in salary, equipment, training, and logistical support. Perhaps more importantly, Washington now calls both countries allies.

**AMISOM is functionally a US surrogate**

**Rozoff 10** – Rick Rozoff, manages Stop NATO and writes on the threat of international militarization, especially on the globalization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Graduate in European literature, 2010 (“meet the new colonialism, just like the old colonialism,” <https://niqnaq.wordpress.com/2010/07/29/meet-the-new-colonialism-just-like-the-old-colonialism/>, July 28th)

The 15th biennial African Union summit in Kampala ended on Jul 27 with mixed results regarding support for US and Western European plans to escalate foreign military intervention in nearby Somalia. The 35 heads of state present at the three-day meeting were reported to have authorized the deployment of 2,000 more African troops to back up the beleaguered Western-backed Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu and to bring the full complement of forces doing so to 8,000, but the new contingent will probably consist solely of troops from Uganda and Burundi, which supply the approximately 6,000 already serving with the African Union Mission in Somalia. Reports of another 2,000 reinforcements from Djibouti and Guinea are problematic and their deployment remains to be seen, not that pressure will not be exerted on those two nations and others from outside the continent. AMISOM is the successor to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development Peace Support Mission in Somalia, set up in 2005 by the six-member group which includes Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda and which also was to have provided 8,000 troops for deployment to Somalia. The 53 members of the African Union except for Uganda and Burundi have been loath to commit military units to intervene in fighting in Somalia, whether against the Islamic Courts Union five years ago or against al-Shabaab insurgents currently. In late 2006, US Sec State Rice met with Ugandan Foreign Minister Kutesa to plan the earlier IGASOM operation, and in Jan 2007, Uganda pledged its first troops which along with those included in a reported offer by Nigeria were to total 8,000.

Three and a half years later, there are only 6,000 foreign troops in Somalia, now under AMISOM, the only difference being the acronym now employed, and all of those from Uganda and Burundi, both nations US military clients and surrogates. The African Union initially approved AMISOM on Jan 19 2007 and granted it a six-month mandate. In Jul 2010, the real prime movers behind the mission, the US and its NATO allies in the EU, are pushing for an escalation of armed intervention in Somalia with more Western-trained Ugandan troops conducting open combat operations, changing the mandate from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, to use the terms employed to mask military aggression. The first attempt by the US and its non-African allies to enforce a compliant government in the Horn of Africa nation, Ethiopia’s invasion in Dec 2006, was assisted by the Pentagon’s Joint Special Operations Command, which conducted military operations inside Somalia no later than the beginning of the next year. At the time, Ethiopia was the second largest recipient of US military aid in Africa, Djibouti, another of the three countries bordering Somalia, being the first, and US military personnel were stationed in the country. Logistical and other assistance was provided by the Pentagon for the operation. On the sidelines of the recently concluded African Union summit, US Asst Sec State for Africa Carson “gathered the presidents of Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Djibouti and Uganda, along with the prime minister of Ethiopia for a closed-door session” to push for more aggressive military operations in Somalia. He was quoted by VoA as saying:

We came away even more united and committed to work together strengthen the TFG, to help strengthen AMISOM, to help strengthen the forces for stability in Somalia and to help do as much as we can to help beat al-Shabab. Al-Shabab represents a foreign and a negative influence that cannot only be destructive inside Somalia, but across the entire region.

Note the opprobrium attached to the word foreign. With what CNN quoted Carson as calling “a wake-up call not only for the region but for Africa as a whole” sounded by deadly bombings in the Ugandan capital on Jul 11, more foreign troops armed, trained, and airlifted by great powers in North America and Europe are destined for deployment to Somalia. Officials from the EU and from Britain and France, the two main historical colonial masters on the African continent, were present at the meeting with Carson and the US’s East African proxies. the VoA report on the closed-door meeting reminded readers:

The EU, the UN and the US are the main financial contributors to the African Union’s AMISOM peacekeeping force in Somalia.

The arm-twisting produced few results. Despite claims by the chairman of the African Union Commission, Gabon’s Jean Ping, that troops from Djibouti and Guinea (Conakry) would join AMISOM/IGAD forces from Uganda and Burundi, the additional troops will almost surely come entirely from the last two nations. Also, the nearly three dozen heads of state at the AU summit rejected the Ugandan and Western demand for a “peace enforcement” rules of engagement mandate. The current chairman of the AU, president of Malawi Bingu wa Mutharika, told reporters:

There have been calls for a change in the mandate to a more robust approach to the insurgent attacks in Somalia by Uganda and Burundi, to go beyond Mogadishu, their current limit, but we did not decide on that.

Ping, however, indicated that the US and NATO allies have not abandoned plans for intensified military operations in Somalia, stating:

We need equipment to match with the change in combat approach. We need helicopters for that. The US and the UK are considering our request.

He also mentioned that France could provide additional helicopters. Even US Attorney General Holder attended the AU summit as the Obama administration’s representative and saw fit to impose his opinions on the 53-nation organization. Before the summit began he met with several of the continent’s heads of state, and in prepared remarks to the summit affirmed:

The US recognizes that ending the threat of al-Shabaab to the world will take more than just law enforcement. That is why we are working closely with the AU to support the African Union’s Mission in Somalia. The US applauds the heroic contributions that are being made on a daily basis by Ugandan and Burundian troops, and we pledge to maintain our support for the AU and the AU Mission in Somalia.

Lightly-armed al-Shabaab militants have now been elevated by Washington to the status of a threat to the world, though Holder’s colleague Carson limited his hyperbole to branding them a “negative influence across the entire region.” The dual bombings in Kampala, incidentally, have been attributed to the group as a warning sign to Uganda to remove and certainly not to increase its troops in Somalia, but in fact appear like a provocation designed to accomplish the opposite result. Four days before the AU summit commenced, the defense chiefs of the six Intergovernmental Authority on Development nations, Uganda, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan, met to discuss boosting troop deployments to Somalia. Weeks before, IGAD had recommended that not the earlier cited figure of 8,000 but fully 20,000 foreign troops could be deployed to Somalia in yet another attempt to salvage the Transitional Federal Government, which doesn’t even control much of the country’s capital despite 6,000 Ugandan and Burundian troops serving as its army. 20,000 foreign troops entering Somalia in the face of overwhelming popular opposition is not a peacekeeping mission. It is an invasion. In mid-July, Ugandan officials announced that their nation’s neighbors in IGAD and in the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Seychelles, Somalia and Uganda, had given “soft support” should Uganda “go on the offensive in Somalia.” The East African on Jul 19 2010 reported:

Ugandan officials now confirm that Kampala is pursuing a two-track strategy that could see it follow Al Shabaab into Somalia with or without UNSC consent. The Museveni administration is prepared to mobilize the entirety of the 20,000 troops needed for a full-scale invasion of Somalia and military sources say Uganda feels it has the capacity to go it alone in Somalia and has been building up its military strength for such an eventuality. The nation’s air force has acquired additions to its arsenal in recent weeks in what observers see as a concerted push to increase Uganda’s military capability. Last week Defence Ministry spokesman Lt-Col Kulaigye stated, “We are one of the most efficient armies in Africa. We can defend our country from anywhere, even within Somalia. Anybody who brings war to us, we take back that war to them. We shall pursue Al Shabaab from Somalia in line with the wishes of the Transitional Federal Government.”

During the last invasion and occupation of Somalia, that of Ethiopia from Dec 2006-Jan 2009, fighting between a similar invading force of 20,000 troops and Somali militias resulted in the deaths of over 16,000 civilians and the displacement of hundreds of thousands in the capital in 2007 alone, according to the Mogadishu-based Elman Peace and Human Rights Organisation. The AMISOM mandate, approved by the AU but, as seen above, with no backing by member states except for Uganda and Burundi, excludes the deployment of troops from nations bordering Somalia: Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. Ugandan military forces and equipment have to cross Kenya to reach the country; that is, to be airlifted by AFRICOM and NATO into parts of the Somali capital not under the control of rebels. The Ugandan government, largely rebuffed at the AU summit, is pushing for the maiden deployment of the 10-nation Eastern Africa Standby Brigade to Somalia, which would appreciably broaden the scope of the conflict. In addition, it is planning to use forums like the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, whose members are Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia, “which already has provisions that offer some room for intervention.” The East African added:

Somalia has already applied to be a member; once that request is approved, Uganda will be able to work together with the Transitional Federal Government and fight Al Shabaab under the legal framework that governs the organisation.

On Jul 20, AFRICOM head Gen Ward addressed CSIS in Washington and pledged that the US will “provide more training, transportation, and logistical aid to the AU mission, known as AMISOM.” Also, VoA reported:

In a briefing to reporters last week, a senior Obama administration official said the US wants to ‘build up the capabilities’ of AMISOM and the [Somali transitional] government.

In late April, Brig-General Kayemba, in charge of training and operations for the Ugandan People’s Defense Force, was in the US and visited the headquarters of US Army Africa, the Pentagon, the National Defense University and a Marine Corps base. Kayemba, who was also trained in the US, said:

This visit strengthens our relationship with the US Armed Forces, particularly with US Army Africa. We are looking forward to even closer cooperation in the future.

Last month officers of the US 17th Air Force, the air component of AFRICOM headquartered at the Ramstein Air Base in Germany, traveled to Uganda for what was described as “a senior leader engagement event to discuss current and future engagement activities between Ugandan People’s Defence Force, Ugandan People’s Defence Air Force and Air Forces Africa.” The head of the US delegation, Brig-Gen Callan, toured the airfield and logistics hangars at the Entebbe Air Force Base and “met with a representative of the US State Dept-contracted Dyncorp, which supports the UPDF with aerial resupply and troop movements of Ugandan, Burundian, and Somali forces in and out of Mogadishu.” DynCorp International is a private military company that receives almost all of its $2b in annual contracts from the US federal government. Callan stated:

Uganda is one of only two countries supporting the UN’s AMISOM mission currently. Though the airlift is contracted, it is good to have the understanding of those ground-based missions and capabilities of the UPDF as we pursue future air force and joint initiatives.

The Defense and Army Attaché at the US embassy in Kampala added:

We’ve been working with their army forces for some time, providing great training opportunities through the State Dept-funded International Military Education and Training program and multi-national peacekeeping operations. Now they would like for us to do that with their air forces.

Both US military officials stressed the Pentagon’s role in upgrading Uganda’s air force for future operations. Military attaché Army Lt-Gen Joachim stated:

17th Air Force brings focus to those much needed air force activities.

In developing bilateral and regional collective military partnerships with most every nation in Africa through AFRICOM, the US works closely with its allies in NATO. This March, “Senior figures from AFRICOM were in Brussels looking to build cooperation with the EU to boost training and reform for African security forces.” The Pentagon has between 2,500-3,000 troops from all four major branches of the military assigned to the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa stationed in Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, Somalia’s neighbor to the north. France has its largest overseas military base and 3,000 troops in the same small nation. Several hundred troops from Britain, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain have also been deployed there under NATO auspices since the beginning of the decade. The US has used its airfield in Djibouti for attacks in Somalia and Yemen. Last year, the Pentagon secured its second major installation in the area, in the Indian Ocean nation of Seychelles, where it has deployed over 130 troops, Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles and three P-3 Orion anti-submarine and maritime surveillance aircraft. In addition to the US-led multinational Combined Task Force 150 and Combined Task Force 151 naval deployments off the shores of Somalia, with logistical facilities in Djibouti, NATO and the EU are running complementary naval operations, Operation Ocean Shield and EU Naval Force Somalia/Operation Atalanta, respectively. This March, NATO announced it was extending its deployment for an unprecedented three years, until the end of 2012. Last month the Netherlands “agreed to a NATO request to deploy a submarine off the coast of Somalia.” In June, the EU followed NATO’s lead when its foreign ministers agreed to prolong Operation Atalanta until Dec 2012. An EU press release at the time revealed the broader Western strategy in the Horn of Africa region, one by no means limited to “combating piracy”:

The root causes of piracy in East Africa lie on land. To address them, the current naval operation is combined with the EU training mission for Somalia, which contributes to the strengthening of the Somali security forces.

In fact, the EU is training Somali soldiers in Uganda for war in their homeland and NATO is transporting Ugandan and Burundian troops for the same purpose. A NATO website feature disclosed in March:

The USA has conducted airlift missions under the NATO banner in support of Ugandan troop rotations. The airlift, which commenced on Mar 5 2010 and was completed on Mar 16 2010, was undertaken by USA contracted DynCorp International, transporting 1700 Ugandan troops from Uganda into Mogadishu and re-deploying 850 Ugandan troops out of Mogadishu. Part of this policy is the NATO standing agreement to provide strategic sealift and airlift support for African Union Troop Contributing Countries willing to deploy to Somalia, recently extended by NATO until Jan 31 2011.

With the deployment of the NATO Response Force Maritime Groups 1 and 2 off the coast of Somalia, first with Operation Allied Provider and since last August with Operation Ocean Shield, the Western military bloc has extended its nearly nine-year-old Operation Active Endeavor naval surveillance and interdiction mission throughout the entire Mediterranean Sea into the Gulf of Aden to the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. The current commander of Ocean Shield, Dutch Commodore Hijmans, held a meeting on board the NATO mission’s flagship on Jul 12 with leaders of Somalia’s semi-independent Puntland region, which has become a land-based component of NATO operations in the Horn of Africa. According to the bloc:

The purpose of the talks was to build on the existing and growing relationship that has developed between NATO and the Puntland authorities.

Several days later, the NATO flotilla docked in Dubai, where Hijmans broached the subject of “chasing Somali pirates” into the Red Sea, an area not yet covered by the Ocean Shield mandate. NATO warships in the Red Sea would place them off the coasts of Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Djibouti, Jordan and Israel, and connect NATO naval operations through the Suez Canal to Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean. Early this month, the French military attaché to Somalia said:

The government of the Republic of France has asked Uganda and other African nations to send more troops to war-torn Somalia.

He urged “more African states to send troops to Somalia.” France will be instrumental in pressuring Djibouti and Guinea to send troops to Somalia, as both countries are former French colonies and Djibouti is a member of the French Community. France is among several EU states that have sent troops to Uganda to train 2,000 Somali soldiers for fighting at home. The others are Spain, which is in charge, Britain, Germany, Italy, Greece, Hungary, Belgium, Portugal, Luxembourg, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Cyprus. A NATO operation in all but name. German troops deployed in May are to “remain in East Africa for a year.” According to the Christian Science Monitor:

Money for logistical support is coming from the US, which has reportedly already pumped millions of dollars into similar smaller training programs run by local militaries in Uganda and Djibouti over the past 18 months. The EU program to train an army to fight for Somalia’s beleaguered transitional government involves 150 instructors from 14 EU countries at a cost of $6m. Since 2004, the US has poured huge resources into initiatives such as the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade, using private contractors and military advisers to train almost 60,000 African soldiers such as Rwandans. AFRICOM has also trained Congolese special forces to operate in the country’s mineral-rich forests and reformed virtually the entire Liberian national army. Easbrig is an example of what Sec State Clinton calls ‘smart power,’ a mixture of military might and nation-building that bears a resemblance to Rumsfeld’s concept of the ‘long war.’ Several critics have likened AFRICOM to a Trojan horse, using the cover of humanitarian aid to pursue the US’s real strategic interests.

**Restriction on military presence lead to CIA black ops fill in**

**Mazzetti 14**

(Mark, Delays in Effort to Refocus C.I.A. From Drone War, APRIL 5, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/06/world/delays-in-effort-to-refocus-cia-from-drone-war.html)

In the skies above Yemen, the Pentagon’s armed drones have stopped flying, a result of the ban on American military drone strikes imposed by the government there after a number of botched operations in recent years killed Yemeni civilians. But the Central Intelligence Agency’s drone war in Yemen continues. In Pakistan, the C.I.A. remains in charge of drone operations, and may continue to be long after American troops have left Afghanistan. And in Jordan, it is the C.I.A. rather than the Pentagon that is running a program to arm and train Syrian rebels — a concession to the Jordanian government, which will not allow an overt military presence in the country. Just over a year ago John O. Brennan, the C.I.A.’s newly nominated director, said at his confirmation hearing that it was time to refocus an agency that had become largely a paramilitary organization after the Sept. 11 attacks toward more traditional roles carrying out espionage, intelligence collection and analysis. And in a speech last May in which he sought to redefine American policy toward terrorism, President Obama expanded on that theme, announcing new procedures for drone operations, which White House officials said would gradually become the responsibility of the Pentagon. Photo John O. Brennan, the director of the C.I.A., took questions after addressing the Council on Foreign Relations last month. Credit Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images But change has come slowly to the C.I.A. “Some might want to get the C.I.A. out of the killing business, but that’s not happening anytime soon,” said Michael A. Sheehan, who until last year was the senior Pentagon official in charge of special operations and now holds the distinguished chair at West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center. A number of factors — including bureaucratic turf fights, congressional pressure and the demands of foreign governments — have contributed to this delay.

**CIA is worse than the joint task force because they use kill teams and black ops to maintain stability – plan is exactly how the US wants to sustain imperialism.**

**Turse 12**

(Nick, The Changing Face of Empire: SPECIAL OPS, DRONES, SPIES, PROXY FIGHTERS, SECRET BASES, AND CYBERWARFARE, pg. 2-4)

That modest training exercise also reflected another kind of pivot. The face of American-style war-fighting is once again changing. Forget full-scale invasions and large-footprint occupations on the Eurasian mainland; instead, think: special operations forces working on their own but also training or fighting beside al- lied militaries (if not outright proxy armies) in hot spots around the world. And along with those special ops advisors, trainers, and commandos expect ever more funds and efforts to flow into the militarization of spying and intelligence, the use of ever more drone aircraft, the launching of cyber-attacks, and joint Pentagon operations with increasingly militarized "civilian" government agencies.

Much of this has been noted in the media, but how it all fits together into what could be called the new global face of empire has escaped attention. And yet this represents nothing short of a new Obama doctrine, a six-point program for twenty-first-century war. American-style, that the administration is now carefully developing and honing. Its global scope is already breathtaking, if little recognized, and like Donald Rumsfeld's military lite and David Petraeus's counterinsurgency operations, it is evidently going to have its day in the sun - and like them, it will undoubtedly dis- appoint in ways that will surprise its creators.

The Blur-ness

For many years, the U.S. military has been talking up and promoting the concept of "jointness" An Army helicopter landing Navy SEALs on a Korean ship catches some of this ethos at the tactical level. But the future, it seems, has something else in store. Think of it as «blur-ness," a kind of organizational version of war-fighting in which a dominant Pentagon fuses its forces with other government agencies - especially the CIA, the State Department, and the Drug Enforcement Administration - in complex overlapping missions around the globe.

In 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld began his "revolution in military affairs;' steering the Pentagon toward a military-lite model of high-tech, agile forces. The concept came to a grim end in Iraq's embattled cities. A decade later, the last vestiges of its many failures continue to play out in a stalemated war in Afghanistan against a rag-tag minority insurgency that can't be beaten. In the years since, two secretaries of defense and a new president have presided over another transformation - this one geared toward avoiding ruinous, large-scale land wars which the U.S. has consistently proven unable to win.

Under President Obama, the U.S. has expanded or launched numerous military campaigns - most of them utilizing a mix of the six elements of twenty-first-century American war. Take the American war in Pakistan - a poster-child for what might now be called the Obama formula, if not doctrine. Beginning as a highly- circumscribed drone assassination campaign backed by limited cross-border commando raids under the Bush administration, U.S. operations in Pakistan have expanded into something close to a full-scale robotic air war, complemented by cross-border helicopter at- tacks, CIA-funded "kill teams" of Afghan proxy forces, as well as boots-on-the-ground missions by elite special operations forces, including the SEAL raid that killed Osama bin Laden.

The CIA has conducted clandestine intelligence and surveillance missions in Pakistan, too. though its role may, in the future, be less important, thanks to Pentagon mission creep. In April 2012, in fact, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced the creation of a new Clx-Hke espionage agency within the Pentagon called the Defense Clandestine Service. According to the Washington Post, its aim is to expand "the military's espionage effort beyond war zones:'

Over the last decade, the very notion of war zones has become remarkably muddled, mirroring the blurring of the missions and activities of the CIA and Pentagon. Analyzing the new agency and the «broader convergence trend" between Department of Defense and CIA missions, the Post noted that the "blurring is also evident in the organizations' upper ranks. Panetta previously served as CIA director, and that post is currently held by retired four-star Army Gen. David H. Petraeus"

Not to be outdone, the State Department, once the seat of diplomacy, continued on its long march to militarization (and marginalization) when it agreed to pool some of its resources with the Pentagon to create the Global Security Contingency Fund. That program will allow the Defense Department even greater say in how aid from Washington will flow to proxy forces in places like Yemen and the Horn of Africa.

One thing is certain: American war-making (along with its spies and its diplomats) is heading ever deeper into "the shadows:' Expect yet more clandestine operations in ever more places with, of course, ever more potential for blowback in the years ahead

**Their aff relies on the liberal binaries between presence and absence, war and peace, and help and harm. In reality, these possibilities are always immanent within the structure of the binary. Claiming that the withdrawal of troops solves this problem is a denial of the logic of total war/**

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It would be tempting-and seemingly appropriate-to apply a Levinasian schema here. What would seem to be at stake is the determination on the part of a putative subject to reduce the other to a level of shared identity. You are my enemy because you could be my co-citizen, a democrat, a Christian. But this politics is not to be subjec-tivized. These markers of identity do not determine the politics here, as much as they are merely its pretext, or point of articulation. Even in the deconstruction of Schmitt, the idea of the impersonality of enmity persists. What is at stake is not a determination to annihilate otherness in order to consolidate a self-identical self. What is revealed is the dynamic always latent within any definition of friendship or enmity, and thus of politics, the range of possible slippages, confusions, and collapses of difference that history can always reveal, events in which I can kill the person I came to protect, I can destroy the village in order to save it, I can be kept free by having my rights taken away from me, and where I can torture in the name of human rights. ¶ What the complexity of the friend/enemy economy stages, therefore, is not a site of subjective truth but a specifically Derridean type of historicity. Derrida discusses how Schmitt's definition of the enemy relies on the "real possibility of war" with them. The real possibility of war is less the announcement of a real event that might or might not happen, as much as a kind of negative messianism: the future event to which we must orient ourselves in order to experience meaning, but whose power resides in the fact that it will not come to pass. This real possibility installs in the heart of Schmitt's argument a kind of suspension that means that the definitions that would seem to rely on this concept become themselves irretrievably unfinished. The distinction between friend and enemy cannot finally be realized, because this real possibility is fundamentally a spectrality. "For what is this 'real possibility' haunting Schmitt if not the very law of spectrality?" Derrida writes (Politics 129). ¶ Politics is haunted by the real possibility of war. This takes the form of friendship and enmity always lying in wait for one another, threatening one another with that which both ruins and defines. Friendship can never not be haunted by the possibility of enmity. It cannot be friendship without this possibility latent within it. I can only be your friend because of the possible enmity that I can see within you and that haunts our friendship, and that might at any sudden and eruptive, but always just-with-held, still-future moment, become you. You are only my friend because you are always about to be my enemy, so that I must be prepared to treat both aspects of you always and at once. Even as I care for you and save you, you threaten me, at least with the threat I must represent to you too, the possibility that we are always already enemies and that I will hurt you even as I help you. The logic of spectrality can never be reduced to a singularity that will save us from this risk. My concern for you cannot be stopped once and forever from becoming my cruelty towards you. We can fight wars for human rights but there will always be only the thinness of a piece of paper between wars for human rights and wars on human rights. And sometimes not even that. ¶ The deconstruction of the friend/enemy and the war/peace binaries do not free us into a world unpolluted by the authoritarianism of self-identity. The continued assumption that deconstruction is an avenue to a kind of freedom-freedom from the current gender regime, from the centripetal logic of colonialism, from the simplest of racial hierarchies-does not help us here.What the deconstructions that have been the focus of this paper do is re-immerse us in the historical complexities of our current political situation. They do not offer some beyond of war and peace, for example, but reveal the obscure entanglements too easily and briskly concealed by talk of "war or peace," "war instead of peace," or "peace instead of war." Promoters of war go to war for putative friends-the whole undifferentiated category of "the Iraqi people," for example-who never quite fail to be read as a danger, and thus can become the object of torture and massacre. They can be friends, Derrida argues, only if they can also be enemies. The aporia at the heart of the friend/enemy distinction has historical results. On the other hand, to argue that peace can be historically realized-in other words, to argue that it can be not just eschatological-**becomes merely a way of pretending that the cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of troops, for example, can resolve complex economic, diplomatic, and strategic inter-relationships, thus leading to a too-easy denial of the many forms war can take. The simple withdrawal of Western troops from a certain place does not mean that it is no longer caught up, directly or indirectly, in the economic, environmental, and diplomatic war the West is always waging under other names. Neither war nor peace protects us from its other.**